INTEGRATED CAPABILITIES: EVOLVING JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR A STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
We're in a world where very few things are going to be solved purely militarily. We're in a world that is going to require interagency cooperation…downplaying the use of force and the need for full spectrum capabilities… -Peter Schoomaker General, USA
Traditional thought maintains that war is a continuation of policy by other means, 1 employing military force for the purpose of compelling our enemy to do our will. 2 This assumes that war is used sequentially as an instrument of power for the purpose of achieving policy ends;
and by not employing force the consequence may be failed policy. Policy does not require the use of force in order to achieve its end and war is more than an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. The nature of war, and the means employed to execute war, has matured beyond the use of force and traditional practices used in the past.
War may be redefined as the application of kinetic or non-kinetic capabilities in order to achieve a desired effect and to compel ones adversary to a defined end-state. In this sense, war becomes capabilities-centric and demands holistic methods of thinking and executing.
Environmental constraints and the speed of global change are far exceeding our ability to adapt and change. Current Joint Capabilities Areas (JCA) must evolve to suit the integrated global environment.
This paper will focus on the capabilities needed in order to gain a strategic advantage in the twenty-first century. Where maneuver warfare is combat-centric, requiring the successful employment, coordination, and synchronization of combined arms, capabilities-centric warfare demands the coordination, synchronization, and employment of combined capabilities, integrating and coordinating all instruments of national power.
Our Environment
For almost five decades, the Cold War defined politics, policy, acquisition, and lifestyle.
Our systems of government, defense, economics, and information exchange were based on a bi-polar relationship. In the international system, the Cold War had its own structure of power:
the balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. 3 This balance of power defined spheres of influence between the communist countries, the West, and the non-aligned Third
World. The Cold War environment also defined industry and technological development. For geo-political defense organization and development, the technology centered on nuclear weapons and massed state-on-state armies. The fall of the Soviet Union and globalization have changed the conditions.
Unlike the Cold War, globalization has its own dominant culture, which tends to be homogenizing, is not static, and involves the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before--in a way that is enabling individuals, cooperations, and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before. 4 The environment is no longer segregated, it is integrated. If the symbol of the Cold War was a wall, the symbol of globalization is the World Wide Web, 5 integrating everybody.
The twenty-first century environment is global and the nature of warfare is changing.
When sovereign nations determine that their freedom is being threatened, re-defined, or eliminated, they will attempt to exercise influence to regain balance or initiative. Globally, this influence is exercised through the freedom of economic, political, or military means. Whether economic, political, or military, all are dependent on freedom of action or freedom of movement.
Freedom of movement would be defined as freedom of maneuver by military forces.
Military units would define this as the movement of forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver, or threaten delivery of direct and indirect fire, 6 and to defeat the enemy by attacking or threatening his center of gravity and shattering the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions. 7 This definition supports force on force with a tactical end state. If war is the application of capabilities, then freedom of movement is the synergy of capabilities in order to achieve a desired effect. For friendly action, this means domain freedom of action and either limiting or coercing adversary freedom of action. Domain freedom of movement is the multidimensional employment of capabilities through all mediums.
Capabilities-centric warfare is more than the employment of military arms, it involves the effective employment of all instruments of national power. If war is defined as combat force-onforce, it will constrain the tactical, operational, and strategic leader. These leaders may only focus on combat, and not fully exercise all instruments of national power.
The art of maneuver warfare offers a prelude to the potential of capabilities-centric warfare. Inherent in maneuver warfare is the speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby complicating his decisionmaking. 8 Therefore, maneuver warfare strives to concentrate friendly strengths against enemy critical vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to the enemy's ability to fight. Maneuver warfare is opportunistic, actively seeking signs of weakness, against which all available combat power can be directed. To accomplish this concentration, Martin van Creveld asserts that there are six vital elements inherent to maneuver warfare:
tempo, Schwerpunkt, surprise, combined arms, flexibility, and decentralized command.
9
These principles and traits are applicable in capabilities-centric warfare, and they are inherent when employing the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power.
Diplomatic, information, and economic freedom of movement is our ability to constantly change our posture in order to gain an advantageous position, keeping the enemy off balance and increasing his friction.
Diplomatically, freedom of movement is articulated through strategic policy and setting conditions that are profitable to US goals and interests. For the last half of the 20 th century, diplomatic decisions were played out as a chess match, movement was slow and deliberate, and was based on a bi-polar global environment. Today, diplomatic posturing is multidimensional, involving state and non state actors.
Informational freedom of movement, which was once analog, is now digital and more decentralized. Employing the information instrument of power requires flexibility and innovation.
We exercise informational freedom of movement by distributing, receiving, analyzing, and crafting information, as well as soliciting indigenous entertainers and journalists. 10 Today, more than ever, economic freedom of movement is based on a global market.
The ability to influence commodity trading, foreign trade and investment, and one's recapitalization of export capital within one's own economy define economic freedom of movement.
When defined and employed independently, instruments of national power can be counter productive. Instruments of national power must be mutually employed if the United States is to be successful in the 21 st century. In order to exercise freedom of movement, capabilities dominance requires a reexamination of the operating environment. Currently, the Operational Environment (OE) is the composite of all the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the commander that exists today and in the near future (out to year 2020). 11 During this time frame, threats will be full spectrum extending from high-tech to low-tech and from conventional to asymmetrical. This variance demands a reexamination and definition of our operating environment.
National policy and the development and application of capabilities are not congruent with this global environment. The speed of environmental change is far exceeding our ability to adapt quickly. All of the national instruments of power, and their systems, are products of Cold War systems, including the Cold War environment. The Cold War environment has given way to a new overarching international system shaping domestic politics, foreign relations, and global policy. 12 The new international system is globalization.
With the evolving global environment, tactical and operational units must be capable of achieving strategic ends. Because of this, understanding environmental effects is critical.
Preparing and understanding the environment forces one to consider multiple means, not simply combat forces. Our experience in Iraq illustrates a failing in understanding the environment and a combat -first approach when our "efforts to build a legitimate government through illegitimate action -including unjustified or excessive use of force, unlawful detention, torture or punishment without trial -are self-defeating, even against insurgents who conceal themselves amid noncombatants." 13 The nucleus of capability-centric warfare is the ability to adapt to the environment.
Leaders and organizations must have the acumen to measure and interpret effects and to quickly transition between available capabilities dependent on environmental constraints (welfare, socioeconomic, geography to name a few), and the states involved.
Maintaining that war is waged between states, the role of the non-state actor offers a unique problem set to the 21st century operating environment. The challenge may not be an asymmetrical threat or terrorism as much as recognizing and identifying states that sponsor non-state players. The most effective method of defeating a non-state actor is to alter its source, a state. All non-state actors require state support in order to achieve their goals. They do not have the resources to sustain themselves and will not present a viable target to counter.
For when the non-state actor begins to resource itself and present a viable target, they then become a state themselves. Success will be defined by one's ability to recognize the everchanging environment and the ability to exercise multiple forms of capabilities and all instruments of national power.
Joint Capabilities
Five years of conflict during the Global War on Terror have illustrated strengths and weakness within our military and the governments' ability to apply national power. The application of military power, especially military force, has primarily been combat-centric and mission accomplishment is defined by success on the battlefield with disregard to other environmental factors affecting the condition. Recently there has been a concerted effort to define and establish joint force capabilities. The intent of this effort is to introduce a paradigm shift from a combat-centric culture to a capabilities based joint force.
As an integral part of the evolving Capabilities-Based Planning process, and in response to guidance in the Strategic Planning Guidance, twenty-one Joint Capabilities Areas were developed representing the beginnings of a common language to discuss and describe capabilities across many related Department of Defense activities and processes. 14 The ability to exploit all human and technical elements of the joint force and its mission partners by fully integrating collected information, awareness, knowledge, experience, and decision making, enabled by secure access and distribution, to achieve a high level of agility and effectiveness in a dispersed, decentralized, dynamic and/or uncertain operational environment.
Joint Public Affairs Operations
The ability to plan, coordinate and synchronize U.S. military public information activities and resources in order to support the commander's operational and strategic objectives through the communication of truthful, timely and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the area of operation (AO) to foreign, domestic, and internal audiences. This capability includes advising the commander on the effects of public information activities on operations, and the effect of operations on foreign, domestic and internal audiences. Joint Interagency/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination The ability to coordinate between elements of the Department of Defense, engaged U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational entities (e.g. partnership states) for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (Derived from JP 3-0800) Joint Protection
The process, set of activities, or utilization of capabilities by which the Joint Force prevents/mitigates adverse effects on personnel (combatant/non-combatant), physical assets, and information of the United States, allies and friends, required to ensure fighting potential can be applied at the decisive time and place against the full spectrum of threats. The Joint Force will achieve this through the tailored selection and application of multi- The ability to conduct operations that apply or counter means other than direct, traditional forms of combat involving peer-to-peer fighting between the regular armed forces of two or more countries. The ability to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations may require low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities that are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently of or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies, and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. (Derived from JP 1-02) The ability to employ joint forces across all domains to achieve national objectives in, from and/or through space.
Joint Information Operations
The ability to conduct operations using the integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities*, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own.
(Derived from DRAFT DoDD 3600.1) 24 A primary purpose of the "Alridge Study" was to integrate Service needs into Department of Defense needs, identifying a priority list for research, development, and acquisition. This evolution began to finally address the need for interagency cooperation, as articulated in some of the tier 1 JCAs, but they are based primarily on 20 th century, Cold War policy. The Department of Defense must move from the interagency cognitive to the practical, 25 incorporating a 21 st Century, globalization, interdependent environment.
Evolution and Revolution
Transforming to an integrated capabilities based force, employing all instruments of national power, will ultimately define success or failure in our ability to defeat threats to U.S. • Carry out assigned missions and tasks and planning for and executing operations, as directed, in support of strategic guidance.
• Plan, conduct, and assess security cooperation activities pursuant to strategic guidance.
• Provide US representation to international and US national agencies. US representation would provide advice and assistance when negotiating rights, authorities, and facility arrangements required in support of US cooperation and military missions.
• Provide a single point of contact for cooperation and security matters within an AOR, excluding the United States.
• When directed, the geographic combatant commander will command US forces conducting peace or humanitarian relief operations, whether as a unilateral US action or as part of a multinational organization: or supporting US forces that have been placed under the authority, direction, or control of a multinational organization.
• Provide the single point of contact for the United States Government within the AOR, excluding the United States, for combating weapons of mass destruction (CbtWMD) activities and the execution of CbtWMD mission.
• Establishing and maintaining a standing joint, integrated force headquarters core element. 34 The An interdependent 21 st century, where integration and assimilation are no longer an anomaly, will require diplomatic, economic, informational, and military interdependence.
Furthermore, employing multiple joint, integrated capabilities and tiers of national instruments of power will afford the U.S. a strategic advantage unmatched on the global landscape.
Conclusion
Where the use of combined arms for military units increases strength and maneuver, the simultaneous use of capabilities enhances one's desired effects. The diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of power must not be allowed to act independently. They must be mutually supportive, leveraging respective independent strength in order to strengthen the whole.
In order to achieve strategic unity of effort, national leaders must not eliminate an instrument of power; rather solve the problem by arranging all available capabilities in such a way that they are mutually supportive in order to achieve a desired effect. This is not simply the relationships between military units, but the relationship between civilian and military organizations. This level of understanding will demand flexible, adaptive organizations led by agile, creative, and well informed leaders. Warfare must be full spectrum, not solely within domains, integrating all instruments of national power. Success will began at the tactical level, beginning with individuals understanding and utilizing non kinetic capabilities in conjunction with kinetic capabilities. This is not to imply that combat forces are irrelevant, rather they are reinforcing the combination of all utilities is a force multiplier.
This idea and a joint, integrated capabilities-centric mindset to national security will define the 21 st century environment. Strategic, operational, and tactical leaders must be resourced with all instruments of national power, not just force, to compel enemies to do ones will. Military culture must maintain a warrior ethos, but not at the expense of achieving the desired effect. 
